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Abstract Complex projects are increasingly collaborative, involving ever greater numbers of multiple 
organisations, while also seeking to deliver high levels of innovation. To gain insight into how supply chain 
management might be developed to better support these developments, many have looked to high volume 
manufacturing to benchmark and seek best practice. Outcomes have often fallen short of expectation: in the 
construction sector, for instance, productivity and adversarial relationships are still a major cause of concern in 
many countries. While there have been some successes in transferring technologies and supply chain innovation 
from high volume manufacturing to engineering intensive sectors, such as construction, shipbuilding, machinery 
and capital goods, the more general narrative is of the difficulties that have arisen. We see these difficulties arising 
from underlying differences between the between supply chain types, and have developed a body of knowledge 
for ‘engineer-to-order’ situations to better support such sectors. The procurement process is crucial to establishing 
conditions for success and is typically a major source of concern for the supply chain. Hence, we summarise the 
findings of a research project that focused on developing the principles required for procurement excellence and 
to structure the possible contractual choices in engineer-to-order supply chains.  
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Introduction  
 
Complex engineering projects are increasingly collaborative, involving multiple organizations, and 
involve innovative aspects. Many have typically looked to high volume manufacturing (e.g. 
automotive) to benchmark and seek best practice. However, we have found it useful to view projects as 
engineer-to-order (ETO) supply chains, where unique solutions requiring innovative engineering work 
are developed ‘to order’ [1]. Most discussion of operations and supply chain management ideas is 
underpinned with the assumption of stable, volume manufacturing, found for instance in retail and 
automotive. While some pioneering practices of relevance to ETO supply chains have emerged from 
these industries, it is possible to see difficulties in transferring practice directly to engineering intensive 
sectors, such as construction, shipbuilding, machinery and capital goods [2]. 
 
This observation led to the development a body of work that enabled a better definition of the underlying 
structures of ETO. This was defined by the extent of customer intimacy with the design and production 
processes, and led to guidance for design of supply chains operating in these structures, most recently 
in [3].  In our previous work, we have also noted the potential for a ‘relational gain’ in terms of hard 
performance improvements resulting from long-term relationships across the supply chain in 
engineering projects [4]. However, a critical barrier was found to be the procurement, commercial and 
contractual assumptions that underpin complex projects, which establish the conditions for effective 
incentives and relationships between different parts of the project delivery teams for engineering work. 
On the one hand the commercial arrangements did not incentivise relationships between different parts 
of the project delivery teams for engineering work, and on the other funding was purely for individual 
projects, so long term relationships were not supported. 
 
Building on the fundamental research, we undertook funded projects with public procurement bodies, 
major contractors and their supply chains, working closely with experienced practitioner stakeholders 
to advance the field. We also worked in partnership with a UK organization that develops, and promotes 
internationally, a suite of contract forms to guide good practice. We selected case studies to cover a 
wide range of complex engineering project scenarios, and interviewed those who were involved in the 
ETO procurement environment (e.g. procurement directors, contract managers), technical experts to 
give insight into engineering designs (e.g. Chief Engineer), and more general managers or project 
managers.  
 
Our research project was carried out against an interesting and changing backdrop. Engineering and 
construction related industries have traditionally found relationships and partnering challenging to 
adopt, since projects have been seen as one-time transactions, but there is evidence of change, and 
academics, governments and professional bodies have been pushing forward an agenda that embraces 
project partnering approaches, alliancing and collaborative procurement [5]; such partnerships involve 
complex risk ownership and resource issues. However, despite the desire for change, there is a general 
lack of guidance as to how to structure procurement approaches in accordance with project needs. 
Hence, we asked ‘Which principles should guide the procurement of engineering work and how should 
engineering clients and contractors structure their contractual choices?’  
 
Achieving Excellence in Procurement 
 
Building on the available evidence from academic studies and government reports, and from our 
observations during our research project, the following principles serve as a useful guide to position at 
the heart of the procurement process. 
• Establish and articulate governance frameworks, giving clear strategy, guidance and expectations 
for the supply chain. This forms a key part of procurement leadership.  
• Focus on whole-life objectives, as far as possible, aligning the achievement of the client’s whole-
life objectives with the rewards and incentives of the supply chain. 
• Continual supply chain engagement to optimize procurement strategies, plans and processes. 
• Longer-term contractual arrangements to support the development of strategic supplier 
relationships, supplier investment, learning and continual improvement, as well as striving for 
collaborative relationships throughout contract delivery. 
• Early appointment of an integrated delivery team to undertake design and construction planning in 
parallel, and to take full advantage of modern technology and methods. 
• Simple contractual interfaces, avoiding multiple and complex contractual interfaces and ensuring 
that all necessary interfaces are well understood and managed empathically. 
• Awarding contracts based on the supplier’s ability to deliver best value solutions (not the lowest 
price). 
• Facilitate the sharing of innovation, ideas and performance and cost benchmarking data across the 
supply chain to support learning and greater efficiency. 
• Developing contracts with a fair and appropriate allocation of risk followed by a joint and active 
focus on risk and opportunity management during delivery. 
• Committing to and implementing fair rewards and prompt payment for all suppliers. 
• Minimize the complexity and cost of procurement exercises, such as pre-qualification and 
tendering. 
 
Implementation of the themes and principles will likely raise some challenging questions. We had many 
discussions and workshops devoted to the achievement of these principles.  We explain below in a 
‘questions and answer’ style for issues that arose frequently.  
 
How should work be packaged as contracts?  
 
Work may be awarded as a large complete contract or broken down into smaller discrete packages. 
Multiple scope packaging has the advantage of flexibility so that different contract conditions can be 
used to suit the different work activities, but has the potential to create interfaces and fragmentation. 
 
Larger all-inclusive packages have the potential to reduce interfacing issues, but the level of risk in 
bearing such a large contract must be carefully considered and/or whether a large contract would attract 
sufficient interest and competition to achieve best value. The capability of a package owner to manage 
the interfaces may also be unknown. The appropriate size and scope of the packages will depend on a 
number of factors, including client ability, capabilities of the supply chain, and project type.  
 
To help make the choice, a recommendation is engaging with the supply chain to gather input into 
contracting strategy, as well as a structured approach to understand capabilities. Open dialogue and 
engagement with supply chain members is needed to evaluate their potential to support the contract 
package approach. A broader commitment to a collaborative climate will help soften any interfaces, 
and a structured process to control and manage interfaces will help to focus on the issues that arise.  
 
How can long-term relationships be developed within the context of engineering projects?  
 
Much has been written about partnering and alliance arrangements, which generally make the case that 
collaborative working across the supply chain maximizes the likelihood of the right outcomes. Strong 
collaborative links will likely arise from a combination of efforts, such as ongoing dialogue between 
organizations and putting in place the structures and incentives to make collaboration possible and 
attractive.  
 
Collaboration approaches include formalizing relational structures across the supply base, for example 
through a classification system with a clear relationship focused lead, developing longer-term 
contractual frameworks and early contractor involvement mechanisms.  
 
We recognize that long term relationships are not easy to sustain. It is likely that relationships will be 
characterized by upward and downward spirals. Hence, problem resolution processes should be 
incorporated into the relationship structure. A long-term relationship will also require robust 
performance to demonstrate efficiency and continuous improvement, which gives the client confidence 
that the contract is still delivering value for money over the long-term. 
 
How can the interests of the parties be aligned?  
 
The contractual framework adopted plays an important part in supporting collaborative behaviors. This 
raises the challenge of moving away from focusing on just one or two important contractual interfaces, 
and taking a broader consideration of crucial systems throughout the supply chain.  
 
The procurement strategy, therefore, should establish common objectives and shared incentives, clear 
signposting of policy, strategy and expectations with regard to the supply chain.  
 
A typical issue observed was the failure to consider the impact of contracts further along the supply 
chain. A possible approach to manage this is the use of ‘back to back’ contracts with consistent terms 
and conditions, which cascade along the supply chain. However, it may be possible to use different 
mechanisms throughout the supply chain to suit the situation.  
 
How can I be an ‘intelligent’ client? 
 
One of the principal roles of clients and large main contractors is to apply effective leadership and 
governance, linking with the ‘intelligent customer’ concept. This concept includes providing clear 
leadership in requirements and incentives to guide the supply chain, and ensuring governance 
frameworks are in place for the contract documentation and procedures.  
 
The way in which organisations behave is largely driven by perceptions of what is in their own interests. 
To this end, incentivization needs to be designed at project level in a way that balances the interests of 
different parties and helps to align them to be both best for each and best for the project. It is difficult 
to appreciate all the potential impacts of contract conditions, or the behaviours that will be incentivised 
by contractual mechanisms. Therefore, it is suggested that clients must reflect intelligently on their 
approaches by conducting ‘What-if?’ scenario reviews to help understand potential impact and ‘future 
proof’ the contract.  
Adopt appropriate assurance procedures, including independent reviews, to provide greater confidence 
that procedures and incentive mechanisms will work as expected. In addition, there is a need to establish 
a continuous improvement mechanism or review mechanisms to capture lessons learned for contracts.  
 
How can uncertainty and risk be considered in procurement and contracts? 
 
While uncertainty and risk ultimately begins and ends with a client, the contracting process is central 
to their management. The golden rule to follow during this contracting process is to place uncertainty 
and risk with those best placed to manage it [6].  
 
Uncertainty must be managed in a coherent way, or else it will more likely than not result in negative 
outcomes. Hence, managing and allocating uncertainty is a key part of procurement strategy. Dealing 
with uncertainty is commonplace in complex engineering projects, and it requires clear allocation of 
contractual risk even if the parties are required to manage risk jointly to deliver outcomes that are best 
for the project.  
 
The pathologies that lead to mismanagement of uncertainties are instantly recognizable, for instance 
through under/over estimating, hiding information and covering up failures [7].  However, a structured 
approach can help, and we return to this issue in the next section.  
 
Forming and structuring a contracting strategy  
 
Having reflected on the core principles at the heart of the procurement process, the next step is to 
develop a contracting approach that is ‘fit for purpose’. Figure 1 shows the interplay of three key 
components of procurement and contract choice.   
 
The model provides an intellectual structure and rationale to form a strategy, by considering the 
interplay between these aspects. It helps form a basis for facilitating discussions between clients and 
contractors. The figure shows relational forms, contract choices and engineering categories, along with 
observed performance indicators and collaborative mechanisms mapped onto it. 
 
Along the ‘slider bar’ on the right-hand side of Figure 1 we show an indicator for the intended allocation 
of financial risk. Although in our wider study, we investigated cases across the spectrum, we only 
highlight here some typical interactions often experienced in industry. Hence, not all aspects of the 
framework are covered here – for more details see [3].   
 
 
 
Figure 1: A proposed structure for contract choices. 
 
It shows the contractual dimension, which includes the three different financial mechanisms: fixed 
price, target cost and cost reimbursable, which are commonly found across contract forms [8]. These 
are crucial mechanisms for the allocation of risk, directing incentives and establishing the conditions 
for desired behaviors in engineering work.  
 
The Fixed Price mechanism offers stipulated work in exchange for a fixed sum of money, often paid as 
a lump sum or instalments. The risks of carrying out the work are largely borne by the contractor, since 
the work must be carried out exactly as specified, and any issues that arise are, in principle, ‘owned’ by 
the contractor. It is perhaps counter-intuitive that such an approach works in the domain of bespoke 
designs; our finding here is that it does when the work is in small ‘bites’ and the contractor is committed 
to a scope of activity—for instance a number of hours spent experimenting—not an outcome.   
 
The Target cost mechanism is characterized by the development of a target, as well as the sharing of 
‘pain-gain’ between employer and contractor.  The approach requires a move towards more transparent 
and open book cost calculations in the development of a target cost. Risks are, therefore, shared between 
the employer and the contractor. 
 
Cost reimbursable mechanisms refer to a situation where the contractor is reimbursed its costs plus a 
fee as the contract progresses. In a pure form of reimbursement, there would be no target or limit, but a 
common practice in this mechanism is to limit the liability or commitment of the contract, and approval 
processes for the employer to review. The employer largely owns the risks, as any changes to plan will 
be borne by the employer in terms of time or cost. 
 
Figure 1 also shows a range of engineering design categories as a key consideration. A key idea 
advanced in this work is that the client or customer can engage with engineering design activities at 
different points in the process, resulting in different customization and risk profiles [9]. The categories 
we developed represent the extent of customer engagement, and offer insight into the extent of risk and 
likelihood of unique or customer specific innovation in the engineering design.  
 
‘Off-the-shelf’ designs take existing designs, drawings and subsystems as the starting point for the 
completion of engineering designs. Here we may find innovative reconfiguration of mainstream 
products, parts of established designs—such as CAD (Computer Aided Design) drawings or product 
libraries—being exploited to produce new customer driven adaptations. The primary risks in this 
category is of unsuitable customisation of existing designs, or an unexpected context. 
 
Adaptive designs require either the creation or modification of codes and standards for a particular 
customer order, as well as those that develop novel designs which take such codes and standards as the 
starting point. The risk here is that adapting codes and standards will be very resource intensive and 
complex, if there are many interacting standards. Designs are developed on an individual basis from a 
‘blank sheet’, or more precisely a set of codes and standards. Hence, the nature of innovation is in 
developing solutions that do not take existing designs as the starting point.  
 
Bespoke designs involve research and development activities that are conducted ‘to order’ for the client 
in the development of engineering designs. Examples include customer specific scientific equipment 
development based on non-established principles, material science testing or engineering testing. There 
is a risk in this category that the proposed solution may not perform as intended, as the innovation is 
unique and unproven.  
 
Finally, there is a relational dimension. As service provision and complexity increases, intimacy 
between the parties should increase and hence the relationship become stronger. In a supply chain 
context, the relationship type, from close to loose, depends on the degree of alignment required for joint 
innovation. Hence, three mechanisms are articulated for the relational dimension. Transactional 
mechanisms, where relational activities are tactical in nature. Collaborative mechanisms include more 
strategic partnering and close inter-organizational working. Intimate mechanisms, is where firms 
become very interlinked in the pursuit of innovation. 
 
It is interesting to understand collaborative and behavioral mechanisms at the interaction points of these 
different considerations. Some examples of this are shown in Figure 1. Such mechanisms observed, for 
example, are partnering charters, Early Contactor Involvement, shared IT (Information Technology) 
systems, co-location, and early engagement workshops. The combination used, we argue, depends on 
the situation. We have found it useful to begin with the engineering design type as a basis for discussing 
strategy and choices, and also taking into account possible performance outcomes.  
 
Figure 1 also provides performance outcome indications. In the bottom left cell of the framework, where 
there are existing designs and a Fixed Price payment mechanism, the contractor is allocated most of the 
risk. Relationships here are transactional.  
 
Our analysis indicates that this approach leads to as-planned performance outcomes, but only if there is 
certainty across all key domains, which are, primarily: certainty of client’s needs, certainty of what the 
solution is, and certainty of the delivery context. Hence, if a contractor can provide a project solution 
from existing designs to meet client requirements that are clearly stated, and there are no complication 
arising from the location or other matters of ‘context’, then a Fixed Price payment mechanism and 
transactional relationship will lead to as planned performance outcomes.  
 
In the middle cell of the framework adaptive designs interact with a target cost and relationships are 
collaborative, the risks are shared between the parties. This approach, in the various case studies 
selected, led to positive performance outcomes. If a contractor must apply or integrate codes and 
standards as a basis for an original design to arrive at the project solution, then a target cost payment 
mechanism and collaborative relationship will lead to positive performance outcomes. 
 
The lower middle cell, where adaptive designs interact with a Fixed Price payment mechanism, showed 
a greater tendency to negative performance outcomes. It is possible that a collaborative relationship can 
mitigate some of this tension, but the contractor assumes most of the risk in conditions where there is a 
lot of engineering uncertainty. If a contractor must apply or integrate codes and standards as a basis for 
an original design in order to arrive at the project solution, then, unless mitigated by close collaboration, 
a Fixed Price payment mechanism will lead to negative performance outcomes. 
 
At the bottom right position of the framework, where relationships need to be intimate, research work 
is undertaken on a Fixed Price basis. In these cases the performance outcomes are positive. Cases we 
observed in this space were more aligned with consortia of companies addressing an innovative 
solution, but were also packaged into a clearly scoped and manageable chunk of work moving the area 
of endeavour towards its eventual endpoint.  
 
If a contractor is to undertake bespoke designs, then a Fixed Price payment mechanism and intimate 
relationship will lead to positive performance outcomes, provided the research is undertaken in a series 
of small steps. At the top right, bespoke designs are undertaken on a reimbursement basis, and we 
observed mixed outcomes in this space.  
 
Lessons Learned 
 
Lesson Learned 1 – Pick your weapons accordingly: There are a wide range of procurement approaches 
available, but the approach taken on any particular project needs to be proactively designed and there 
is a need to pick your weapons according to the situation.  
 
We suggest, however, that the project management industry needs a better set of principles and 
structures to inform decision-making when setting the project procurement and contracting strategy. 
These principles and structures will need to be considered on an ongoing basis, and then specifically 
revisited for each procurement decision, but with reference to the principles and intellectual structure 
guiding the decisions. The spectrum of engineering types outlined in this article are a good starting 
point and have trade-offs which need to be understood and managed. 
 
Lesson Learned 2 – Lead as an intelligent client: Clients need to lead the way by being an ‘intelligent 
client’, but contractors can help them. For implementation, clients will need to consider how current 
practices are anchored in the principles and mechanisms described in this article.  
 
To become more effective, there will likely be an initial need to revisit and integrate internal teams, 
such as technical, commercial, procurement and delivery teams. The models and principles in this article 
can then be used as a basis for discussion between client and contractor, considering early engagement 
of relevant parties, including internal teams and relevant external parties. Contractors may also put 
themselves in an informed position so that they may help to guide clients. 
 
Lesson Learned 3 – Configure and develop a spectrum of relationship types: Collaborative relationships 
need investment, but your ability and resources to invest are limited. At the outset of this article, we 
posited the idea that long term relationships can lead to positive performance outcomes. However, these 
often require trust building, subtle and sophisticated forms of relationships building, and frameworks 
with which to develop relational forms. We refer to ‘relational investments’ to characterize this, which 
may take the form of specialized investments between firms, which act as the basis for relational ties. 
These may take the form of, for example, physical, people-based, process or technology-based 
investments that are specific to a project or relationship. It is possible to consider these viz-a-viz Figure 
1 in this article.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The procurement of engineering work has too often been guided by intuition, rather than robust 
evidenced based rationale, and there is little guidance for clients as to how to establish the right 
approach. While many contextual factors, such as planning, financial, environmental factors, and health 
and safety concerns, may shape the final approach, we have presented a set of principles to achieve 
procurement excellence. We explained how three key considerations can form the basis and structure 
for a rationale for contract choice.  
 
If done well, good procurement establishes the conditions and climate to ensure benefits are realized 
for the public good, and that the right behaviors across the supply chain.  
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